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Abstract
Starting sometime in the seventeenth century, vows (nezir, Ar. nadhr) began to be 
used in the central lands of the Ottoman Empire as a means to seal contracts of a 
public nature. Although these vows were similar to the more common and older 
forms of customary compacts that also pertained to public matters, vows had a better 
defined status in sharia and could entail worldly liability in addition to moral/religious 
obligation. Using court records and fatwa collections, I argue that vows exemplified 
the expansion of legality and control of the state over custom and morality, as well 
as the recognition of a customary device of contract and its penetration into the legal 
sphere. On a secondary level, I also provide new material on contemporary political 
culture and the question of legal pluralism in the Ottoman context. 
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In March 1703, coppersmiths in the town of ‘Ayntāb (modern Gazian-
tep) reached a unanimous decision against preemptive purchases of 
unprocessed copper. According to their deposition, which was registered 
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at the court, some of the coppersmiths bought raw copper outside the 
town before it reached the sheikh of the coppersmiths to be distributed 
among the craftsmen, as agreed by all (cümlemiz ma‘rifetiyle ve ittifāḳiyle). 
They then made a contract and compact (ḳavl u ittifāḳ ve ‘ahd u mīsāḳ) 
to the effect that should any of them  breach the compact (naḳż-i ‘ahd ), 
from then on, he would pay 50 ġurūş as nezir (vow) towards the repair 
of the court building.1 A similar resolution by felt-makers of the same 
town, dated December 1738, was also registered at the court as a vow. 
This time the craftsmen pledged not to put oxen wool in the felt they 
produced and to observe specific measures in making saddles. They also 
“[vowed] to pay 50 ġurūş towards the cleaning of the Sacur River should 
any of [them], whoever that be, violate [their] compact and contract.”2 
At first sight, these agreements may not strike students of Ottoman 
urban history as original, since it is now recognized that collective 
agents, such as neighborhoods or guilds, enjoyed a fairly large degree 
of autonomy that could materialize also in collective agreements such 
as these. The novelty of the compacts here was that they were sealed 
with a nezir, a vow (Ar. nadhr),3 literally “to oblige oneself or to 
undertake.”4 This pre-Islamic practice was incorporated into Islamic 
culture and used throughout Islamic history, as far as we know, primar-
ily for private purposes. Its use in connection with public issues in the 
Ottoman Empire, as in the examples above, was a novelty that seems 
to have emerged sometime in the seventeenth century. 
Not all nezirs were of an economic nature. Some were openly polit-
ical and meant to be binding for a group of people or a more structured 
collectivity, for individuals vis-à-vis collectivities or collectivities vis-à-
vis the state. Thus, vows operated both at local and imperial levels, and 
always pertained to a matter of public concern.  For this reason, in this 
study I call them public vows, as opposed to vows that pertained to 
private concerns of individuals; the latter were not registered.
1) Ayntab Court Register no. 52/251 (1/3 Şevvāl 1114/1703).
2) Ayntab CR no. 93/246 (10 Ramażān 1151/1738).
3) Most of the primary sources used in this study are in Ottoman Turkish. Legal and other 
terms of Arabic origin are transliterated in their Turkified version. Arabic transliteration 
will be used for specifically non-Ottoman contexts and periods. 
4) Bilal Esen, ‘İslam Hukuku’nda Nezir ve Adak’, Unpublished MA thesis (Marmara 
University, 2003), 7.
The examples of public vows thus far identified are all from Anato-
lia and Rumeli, with the exception of a few records from seventeenth-
century Aleppo that Charles Wilkins has kindly shared with me.5 
Notwithstanding impressions of colleagues working on different parts 
of the Arab provinces,6 new research may bring to light further examples 
of public vows from this region.  New examples may emerge from other 
parts of the Balkans as well. For practical reasons, this study has been 
limited to Rumeli and Anatolia.  
In what follows, I first survey different uses of vows in public life, 
and then examine them from legal and extra-legal perspectives as con-
tractual devices. It emerges from this examination that public vows 
exemplified the expansion of the legal sphere vis-à-vis custom and 
morality as well as the guardianship of the state over the claims of God. 
It is also possible to read the process in reverse however: public vows 
represented recognition of a customary device of contract, hence expan-
sion of custom into the legal sphere. On a secondary level, this observa-
tion provides new material for the debate on the question of legal 
pluralism in the Ottoman Empire. It also provides new material for the 
study of contemporary political culture: public vows resonated with a 
broader culture of consent and contractual politics that matched the 
tenor of vigorous local politics and redefined center-periphery relations 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Nezir
1.1. e Basics
A nezir is a compact (‘ahd ) between an individual and God. A third 
party may be specified as a beneficiary of a vow (menzūr leh), thereby 
committing the vow-taker to a certain course of action in relation to 
this other person. The possibility of involving a third party made nezir 
5) Personal communication, December 2008. 
6) Personal communications with Rifaʿat Ali Abou-El-Haj, Nelly Hanna, Abdul-Karim 
Rafeq and Dror Ze’evi, 2001-2008. 
an instrument of contractual commitment in private as well as public 
matters.7 
Vows of a public nature emerged in the central lands of the Ottoman 
Empire probably around the middle of the seventeenth century and 
began to appear in Ottoman records in the second half of the century. 
Of the thirteen fatwa collections consulted for this study, the three early 
works by Zenbilli ‘Alī Cemalī (1503-1526), Ṣun‘ullah el-Ḥalebī (1599-
1603), and İbrāhīm el-Ḥalebī (d. 1549)8 do not contain any fatwas 
about public oaths or vows. The large majority of fatwas concerning 
public oaths or vows are located in two collections: that of Minḳārizāde 
Yaḥyā Efendī (1662-74) and Menteşīzāde ‘Abdü’r-rahīm (1715-16), 
with a few others from Yaḥyā b. Zekeriyā (1622-32), ‘Aṭā’ullah Efendī 
(1715) and Ibn Abī İsḥaḳ (1685-1752/53).9 The beginning of registra-
tion, let alone the emergence of the practice itself, is certainly more 
difficult to trace. The earliest recorded example I have been able to 
identify dates from the period of the Ottoman-Habsburg war of 1683-
99, i.e. a few decades after jurists began to debate public vows.10 Most 
probably, the practice continued unrecorded for some decades before 
jurists took notice and addressed it as an issue. In the meantime, it 
became customary to take the cases to the court. While the juridical 
7) See Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 42-72, regarding the political use of oaths and vows in 
the tenth and eleventh centuries. Also EI 2, s.v. nadhr (J. Petersen) 7: 846-47. 
8) Zenbilli ‘Alī Efendī, Fetāvā-yı ‘Alī Efendī (Süleymaniye Library, Ms. Fatih no. 2390); 
Ṣun‘ullah Efendī, Fetāvā (Süleymaniye Library, Ms. Serez no. 1132); İbrahim Halebi, İzahlı 
Mülteka’l-Ebhur Tercümesi, trans. Mustafa Uysal (İstanbul: Dizerkonca, 1968). e latest 
şeyḫü’l-islām collection used is that of Dürrīzāde Meḥmed ‘Ārif (d. 1800), Netīcetü’l-fetāvā 
ma‘a’n-nuḳūl (İstanbul: Maṭba‘a-yi Āmire, 1265/1848). I have also consulted M. Emin Ibn 
Abidin, Reddü’l-Muhtar Ale’d-Dürri’l-Muhtar: Şerhu Tenviri’l-Ebsar, tr. Ahmed Davudoğlu 
(Istanbul: Şamil Yayınları, 1983), vol. 7. 
9) ‘Aṭā’ullah Meḥmed b. İbrāhīm Efendī (d.1715), Fetāvā-yı ‘Aṭā’iyye (Süleymaniye Library, 
Ms. H. Hüsnü Paşa 427); Minḳārizāde Yaḥyā Efendī (1662-74), Fetāvā (Harvard Law 
School Library, HLS MS 1402 [ca. 1720 C.E.]); and Menteşīzāde ‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī 
(1715-16), Fetāvā-yı ‘Abdü’r-rahīm (İstanbul: Darü’t-tıbā‘ati’l-Ma‘mūre, 1827). 
10) Ayntab CR no. 37/89/1, dated rebī’ü’l-āḫır 1100/1689, where the people of Ayntab 
pledge to pay the state 2,500 akçes (~ 20 ġurūş) per neighborhood should they fail to 
denounce deserters from the war front. Also no. 37/75/1, dated cemāzīyü’l-āḫır 1100/1689. 
Also Ayntab CR no. 18/258/1, cemāzīyü’l-āḫır 1070/1660, a similar collective oath regis-
tered on the occasion of Abāza Hasan Paşa’s revolt--although the word nezir is not used 
here.  
debate seems to have faded out around the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the practice itself continued. 
To date, only Faroqhi and Tamdoğan have examined nezir in the 
Ottoman context, and both of them have focused on vows sworn by 
collectivities concerning security matters relating particularly to the 
control of bandits and tribes. These studies highlight the element of 
state initiative and the penal aspect of the practice.11  Tamdoğan, in 
addition, recognizes their contractual aspect but does not elaborate on 
it. As indicated by the vows sworn by craftsmen (see above), there was 
another group of oaths and vows that pertained to public life and did 
not involve the central state. It is in this second group that the contrac-
tual aspect of the vows comes out most clearly. However, vows elicited 
by the state in state-society/center-periphery relations operated within 
the same cultural parameters as vows that involved local parties alone. 
1.2. Vows as Penal Surety 
In his Zübde-i Vekayiât, the chancellor chronicler Sarı Mehmed Paşa 
writes about two riots that took place in the provinces: one in Bosna 
Saray (Sarajevo) in 1093/1682, and a few years later, another in 
Cyprus.12 According to the chronicler, the Bosna Saray incident was 
started by peasants who had been summoned to town in the aftermath 
of an unresolved murder. It was the deputy governor’s idea “to make 
the Muslims and infidels stand surety for one another” and pay him 
and the qadi two ġurūş per guarantor. When the peasants came to town, 
events took an unexpected turn. Aided by some urban ‘outlaws’, the 
11) Suraiya Faroqhi, “Räuber, Rebellen und Obrigkeit im osmanischen Anatolien,” Periplus 
3 (1993), 31-46. Faroqhi has identified a register devoted exclusively to nezir records dating 
from 1766-1782. Işık Tamdoğan, “Le nezir ou les relations des bandits et des nomades avec 
l’État dans la Çukurova du xviiie siècle,” in Sociétés rurales ottomanes, Ottoman Rural 
Societies, ed. A. Mohammad et al. (Le Caire: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2005). 
Also see Hülya Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman town: ‘Ayntab in the 17th 
Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 162-64.
12) Mehmed Paşa does not specify the date of the Cyprus affair. He writes about the event 
as a prelude to the events of 1102/1690-91. Silahşör Mehemmed Bey, alias Fireng Bey, 
who played a key role in suppressing both riots, died in 1097/1685-86. Hence, the two 
events must have taken place only a few years apart. Defterdar Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i 
Vekayiât, Tahlil ve Metin (1066–1116/1656–1704), ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: TTK, 
1995), 390-92.
peasants broke into the court, where they pillaged the qadi’s coin chest, 
threw him down the stairs, and beat him and his deputy to death. 
In the Cyprus incident, the offenders were soldiers, some “native 
janissaries” (yerlü yeñiçeri) and prebend-holders who had been “encour-
aged in their mischief,” so our chronicler says, “by some of the  notables”. 
The rebels killed their commanders and forced the deputy governor 
into flight, but they paid for their actions dearly in the end. Many of 
them were executed and the notables (a‘yān) who were involved in the 
rebellion were given a severe rebuke (zecr ü ta’nīf   ). In addition, the 
Cypriots vowed to give the heads of thirty rebels to the authorities and 
50,000 gold coins to the imperial treasury, should such an improper 
situation arise again on the island. A stone pillar was erected in front 
of the Ayasofya Mosque and the vow was carved on it so that “the 
people of the island should remember what had happened and avoid 
such rebellion and mischief (baġī ve fesād ).”13  
Similarly, in Bosna Saray, the townsmen pledged to pay 40,000 gold 
coins to the state and to hand over a number of heads from among the 
“villains” should such mischief happen again. In this instance, too, the 
vow was sealed by a column erected in a public spot to remind the 
townsmen of the combined power of God and the state as parties to 
the vow and to ensure the town’s compliance with the compact (kemer-
bend-i mīsāḳ).14  While these are the only two incidents I have come 
across in which a vow was graphically sealed by a monument, we find 
similar vows in the court registers of various Ottoman towns.  
Vows instigated by the state brought together elements of two legal 
principles: collective penal responsibility and criminal surety. The for-
mer consisted of (a) paying the blood money (diyet) as the offender’s 
solidarity group (ʿāḳile)15 in case of unintentional homicide and bodily 
13) “…kendü ta’ahhüdleri üzere ṭaraf-ı mīrīye ellibiñ altun ve bā’i s-i nā’ire olanlardan daḫī 
otuz mikdārı kelle ġalṭīde-i riḳāb-ı humāyūn-ı şehriyārī olmak üzere muṣammem ve nezr ü 
ta’ahhüd eylemeleriyle ... zihām-ı tırāşīde-i mücellādan perdāhte maḫrūṭıyyü’ş-şekl bir ṭaş īcād 
ve nezr ü ta’ahhüdlerin ol ṭaş üzerine ḥakk itdürüp”. Defterdar Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i 
Vekayiât, 390-92.
14) Zübde-i Vekayiât, 132-33.  
15) Baber Johansen, “Eigentum, Familie und Obrigkeit im hanafitischen Strafrecht. Das 
Verhältnis der privaten Rechte zu den Forderungen der Allgemeinheit in hanafitischen 
Rechtskommentaren,” in Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the 
Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 358-59 [org. in Die Welt des Islams 19 (1979), 1-73]; 
harm, and (b) taking the oath of compurgation (ḳasāme) when blood 
money was due but the assailant was not known. Judging from Ebus-
suud’s fatwa on the matter and other şeyḫü’l-islāms’ rulings regarding 
unintentional homicide, the Ottoman center dispensed with the con-
cept of the solidarity group and adopted a more individualistic inter-
pretation of the law.16 Yet, jurists retained the principle of oath of 
com purgation, which limited the idea of individual liability.
In the oath of compurgation, collective liability is predicated on a 
clear conception of the right and responsibility to control a given space, 
which ultimately derives from ownership, usufruct or profit.17 This 
principle, combined with limited technologies of control in a pre-mod-
ern state, dictated a tri-partite division of space. In privately owned 
spaces such as real estate and its appurtenances, owners are expected to 
be in control, and they are legally liable. In public spaces that are no 
one’s property and utilized by an uncertain number of people, such as 
central markets, main roads and interregional routes or bridges, the 
state is in control and liable. Finally, in intermediate spaces utilized by 
a defined group of people, such as neighborhood lanes, neighborhood 
mosques or village commons, the community of users is legally liable.18 
Clearly, the state’s obligation to maintain security, and its liability 
when it could not, is only complementary to that of private persons 
and communities in inhabited areas. Two imperial decrees dated 1746 
demonstrate the logic of this division of labor. According to them, the 
principle of collective liability had not been practiced in the capital city 
H. N. Bilmen, Hukukı İslamiyye ve Istılahatı Fıkhiyye Kamusu (Istanbul: Bilmen Yayınevi, 
1969), 3: 54.
16) Colin Imber, Ebu’s-Su`ud, e Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 247. Peters notes that the solidarity group did not exist in India either. 
Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: eory and Practice from the Sixteenth 
to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
92. For royal regulations on the topic, see Uriel Heyd, Studies in Ottoman Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 106, 115-18, 131, 308-11. 
17) Johansen, “Eigentum, Familie und Obrigkeit”;  Minḳārizāde, Fetāvā, 142b-143b; 
Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, Fetāvā-yı ‘Alī Efendī (İstanbul: Maṭba‘a-i ‘Āmire, A.H. 1311), 2:318; 
Feyżullāh Efendī, Fetāvā-yı Feyżiyye ma‘an-nukūl (İstanbul: Dāru’t-tabā‘at el-Āmire, A.H. 
1266), 541; see also Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Com-
parative Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 97; and Bilmen, 
Kamus, 3:165. 
18) Minḳārizāde, Fetāvā, 143a; Bilmen, Kamus, 3:161.
“from time immemorial.” Even if the decrees ‘invented the tradition’, 
as the expression ‘time immemorial’ might signify in public discourse, 
it is possible that by 1746, the principle had indeed been rescinded in 
the capital. Historian Akman, who has discovered these decrees, rightly 
argues that the collective oath of compurgation presumes a small com-
munity that lacks anonymity, and it would have been an impractical 
and ineffective practice in a metropolis like Istanbul with a population 
of half a million in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.19 In pro-
vincial towns, however, the principle of collective responsibility may 
have remained a viable tool of social control well until the end of the 
empire.  
One can trace elements of another legal practice, criminal surety 
(kefālet), in state-instigated vows. Kefālet refers to the responsibility to 
bring a defendant to court or to hand him over to authorities,20 as in 
the case of vows instigated by the state. In Ottoman practice, criminal 
surety was also linked to ḳasāme, which is based on collective spatial 
responsibility. For example, if someone is suspected of mischievous 
behavior, he may be evicted from his neighborhood unless someone 
stands surety for him, and the neighbors might decline to do so for fear 
of being held liable in the future, through ḳasāme, should the suspect 
indeed turn out to be a mischievous fellow.21 
19) Mehmet Akman, “Osmanlı Hukukunda Kasâme,” Türkler, 13 (2002), 789-94. 
20) Ahmed Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri (Istanbul: FEY Vakfı, 
1990-96), II:246; III:106; VIII:111. Cp. Joachim Eibah, “Burgers or the town council? 
Who was responsible for urban stability in early modern German towns?” Urban History, 
34,1 (2007), 17-18, for oaths of Urfehde taken by citizens in German towns to pursue 
offenders, prevent released prisoners from committing violence, help the offended and 
settle conflicts. 
21) See Heyd, Studies, 250, 310. According to Özcan and Akman, in the sixteenth and early 
eighteenth century, surveys occasionally were made to register the inhabitants of all or 
selected neighborhoods in Istanbul. Every inhabitant was expected to present someone as 
surety, and if he/she? could not, he/she? was banished from the neighborhood. See Tahsin 
Özcan, “Osmanlı Mahallesi: Sosyal Kontrol ve Kefalet Sistemi,” Marife 1 (2001), 129-51 
and Mehmet Akman, ‘Osmanlı Hukukunda Faili Bilinmeyen İtlaf Durumlarında 
Öngörülen Ortak Sorumluluğun Hukuki Niteliği,’ Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları 3 
(2007), 789-94. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say how common this practice was in other 
periods in Istanbul or other parts of the empire. In an ongoing study of kefālet in sixteenth-
century Palestine, Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj focuses on the social and consensual dynamics 
of the practice.  “A Probe into the Social,” unpublished paper given at the Institute of 
Thus, the vows under consideration here mirrored functions of both 
the oath of compurgation and criminal surety. For example, in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, several tribes among the Yeni-İl and 
subjects of the Ḥaremeyn-i Şerifeyn in the Province of Maraş agreed to 
pay 1,750 to 24,500 ġurūş to the imperial treasury or the imperial 
kitchen as nezir if they were to harm the property of the settled com-
munities or if they failed to hand over miscreants to the authorities.22 
In 1776, people of Karahisar-i Sahib in western Anatolia vowed to pay 
the state nezir money if they let the notables continue to recruit tribal 
mercenaries, and in 1778 they vowed to deny entry to a rebel a‘yān to 
the region.23 In a way, it would seem, the state was acting as a public 
prosecutor in lieu of those anonymous groups of people injured by the 
collapse of order. It sought compensation, just as blood money was due 
to the state treasury for victims who died without heirs.
These cases did not involve either the oath of compurgation or crim-
inal surety, but rather a novel combination. In a nezir, people vow to 
maintain order, to collaborate with authorities, to deliver culprits or, 
less commonly, to be obedient themselves. Unlike the oath of compur-
gation, which is followed by the payment of blood money, vows are 
promissory, i.e. future-oriented, and meant to be preventive. In that 
regard, they function more like criminal surety.24 Unlike collective penal 
Islamic Studies, McGill University, March 2006. I am grateful to Prof. Abou-El-Haj for 
sharing this study with me. 
22) Dated 1701-1702, 1714, 1718, in Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmpara-
torluğu’nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi  (Ankara: TTK, 1997), 38; dated July 
1734, in Cemil C. Güzelbey and Hulusi Yetkin, Gaziantep Şer’i Mahkeme Sicillerinden 
Örnekler (Gaziantep: GKD, 1966–70), vol. 4:17.
23) Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Âyânlık (Ankara: AÜDTCF, 1977), 199, 228. 
From Afyon Court Register nos. 53, 55; For other examples from Anatolia and Rumeli, 
see Tamdoğan, “Le nezir”; Faroqhi, “Räuber, Rebellen und Obrigkeit”; M. Çağatay Uluçay, 
XVIII ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan ’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri (Istanbul: Berksoy, 
1955); Güzelbey and Yetkin, Gaziantep, 29, 87-9, 102-3; Aysel Danacı, ‘e Ottoman 
Empire and the Anatolian Tribes in the 18th and 19th centuries’, Unpublished MA esis 
(Boğaziçi University, 1998); Antonis Anastasopoulos, “Fighting the Flame of Disorder: 
Ayan Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59,” International 
Journal of Turkish Studies 8 (2002), 73-88.
24) Abdullah Kahraman, “İslam Hukukunda Şahsa (Nefse) Kefâlet Müessesesi Ve Türk Ceza 
Muhakemeleri Hukuku’ndaki Teminatla Salıverme Müessesesi İle Mukayesesi,” http://
www.cumhuriyet.edu.tr/edergi/makale/234.pdf.
liability, which is based on law, and therefore automatic, nezir presup-
poses the willful agency of the vow-taker. In both respects, this type of 
vow is closer to legal surety, hence contractual.
There is good reason to suspect that vows that involved the state did 
not really depend on the freewill of the communities in question. In 
his account of the Saray Bosna incident, Mehmed Paşa gives a fairly 
clear hint to that effect, presenting the pledge as part and parcel of 
oppressive measures taken by the officer in charge of the inquiry. This 
is probably why he characterizes the incident as a “so-called nezir.”25 
Even though the court records about nezirs involving the state depict 
a consensual process rather than an oppressive one, Mehmed Pasha may 
have hit the mark more accurately than the court scribes did. Neverthe-
less, the presentation of this political encounter between (agents of the) 
state and (agents of the) people within a consensual framework rather 
than a relation of command is important and signifies the acknowledge-
ment of the limits of the state’s territorial control. Likewise, the registra-
tion of state-instigated vows as acknowledgement (iḳrār) records signed 
by witnesses, as in ordinary iḳrārs, points to a concern to legitimize 
them within a legal framework. 
1.3. Political Matters 
Oaths and vows were also used in local public life. Various communi-
ties, rural as well as urban, became parties to pledges sealed by oaths 
and vows. In most cases, the person taking the vow was an individual 
who pledged before a collectivity that he would no longer claim this or 
that office or authority over this or that community. These vows were 
openly political. For example, claims of official a‘yānship (or head a‘yān) 
in the eighteenth century were frequently subject to vigorous contesta-
tion. One way to keep unwanted a‘yāns out of office, it seems, was to 
make them vow not to hold office again—although such vows did not 
always work.26 According to contemporary fatwas, vows could be used 
to regulate the holding of other offices as well. Thus, claims to a variety 
of positions, such as chief merchant (bazarbaşı), deputy judge,27 and 
25) “gūyā cümleyi nezre baġlayup...”, Zübde-i Vekayiât, 132.
26) For Ankara (1767) and Akhisar (1802?), see Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Âyânlık, 
211, 222.
27) ‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:319, 320, 323.
even the position of primary judge,28 could be subject to a nezir.  In 
one case from Ayntab, Mustafa Beşe swore in 1683 that he would never 
become the Head Butcher (kasabbaşı) again: “If I do,” he said, “and if 
the qadi, whoever he might be at the time, does not collect my fifty 
ġurūş nezir, I will hold him responsible on doomsday.”29 
One also sees ‘people’ (ahālī) as primary agent of vows. For example, 
a court record from Malatya informs us that in 1714, the townspeople 
took an unconditional vow declaring their determination to “prohibit 
and expel” the oppressive deputy governor if he continued to arrest and 
imprison people without the court’s involvement.30 This political initia-
tive is the mirror image of vows made by individuals to renounce office. 
‘People’ could also be the direct beneficiary (menzūr leh) of a vow. For 
example, in eighteenth-century Anatolia, in a number of instances, the 
official a‘yān renounced his claim to office and pledged nezir money to 
be paid to the ‘people’ if he continued his claim.31 It remains unclear, 
however, how the payment was made, who actually received it or how 
it was dispensed. The pledge (menzūr bih) was always a certain amount 
of money in public vows.
Illegitimate claims of power were sometimes characterized as “med-
dling with the affairs” of a collectivity or, sometimes, of a whole prov-
ince.32 In the fatwa collections from the period, imams swear not to 
intervene in village matters or not to lead the prayer again, a Turcoman 
tribesman swears not to intervene in tribal matters, and a village warden 
28) Ibid., 1:321. 
29) Ayntab CR no. 35/2/1. 
30) “Malaṭyā ahālīsi meclis-i şer’īde ‘ahd-ı nezir itmişdir ki... fī-mā tenbīh Ken’ān bir kimesneyi 
şer’īsiz tutmaya tutar ise cümle ile men’ ve def ’ eylemeye cümle böyle ‘ahd itmişlerdir.” Quoted 
by Mehmet Karagöz in “XIII. Yüzyılın Başlarında Malatya ve Çevresinde Eşkiyalık Hare-
ketleri,” Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırmaları Mecmuası 5 (1994), 206. e text is from the court 
registers of the town but the register number is not specified. Similarly, ‘Abdü’r-rahīm 
Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:322, 324.
31) Yuzo Nagata, Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi (Tokyo, 1976) 6, 30; 
Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Âyânlık, 211, 222, 264. e authors paraphrase the 
relevant documents; they both use the word “ahālī,” which is likely the original wording. 
For an overview of possible beneficiaries, i.e. destinations for the promised sums, see p. 98 
and fn. 47 below.
32) Ayntab CR no. 40/207/3, receb 1104/1693, and no. 41/152/1, cemāzīyü’l-evvel 1103/ 
1692.
(ketḫüdā) swears not to intervene in tax matters.33 Sometimes, ille-
gitimate intervention in communal matters is characterized in general 
terms, such as oppression or mismanagement of the communal taxes.34 
In such situations, the claimant promises in his court deposition that 
he will mind his own business in the future, or pay, for example, 100 
ġurūş nezir if he breaches his vow.35 
Non-Muslims could also make vows. In August 1708, a delegation 
of non-Muslims in Ayntab went to court together with one of their 
co-religionists, claiming that he meddled in their affairs. They wanted 
him to vow to pay 200 ġurūş for repair of the court building if he 
interfered in community affairs again. He did, and the act was duly 
recorded.36 This is interesting for two reasons. First, it confirms earlier 
findings about the interface between non-Muslim communities and 
the Islamic legal domain. Second, it should be noted that Hanafis, 
Malikis and most Shafiis do not accept nezir by non-Muslims—
although the point is disputed. Thus, the taking of public vows by 
non-Muslims suggests that the practice was desacralized.37  
33) ‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:323; ‘Aṭā’ullah Meḥmed b. İbrāhīm Efendī (d. 1715), 
Fetāvā, 122. Also ‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī, Fetāvā, 1: 323, where an unspecified person vows 
not to demand menzil contributions from a village.
34) Ankara CR no. 168, dated 1777, in Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Âyânlık, 264; 
Ayntab CR no. 40/17/1 receb 1103/1692. 
35) For other examples, see Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskânı 
(İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1987), 134-36, 142; Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Âyânlık, 
199, 211, 228; Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı, 38. For a non-religious pledge not to 
intervene in the affairs of the neighborhood and its cash endowment, similar in spirit to 
vows, see M. Faruk Karacaoğlu, ‘1765–1768 Yılları Arasında Konya’da Sosyal Ve Ekonomik 
Hayat (59 Numaralı Konya Şer’iye Siciline Göre)’, Unpublished MA esis, Selçuk Uni-
versity, 2008, 296-97 (org. 54-2, dated November 1767).
36) Ayntab CR 59/305/2, cemāzīyü’l-āḫır 1120/1708. Also Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparator-
luğunda Âyânlık, 264. On nezir by Jews, see Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 
16. Asır Türk Hayatı, ed. Mehmet Ertuğrul Düzdağ (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972), 
93.
37) Esen, ‘İslam Hukuku’nda Nezir’, 65. Patricia Mihaly Nabti reports the continued (?) 
use of personal vows (nidr) among Christians as well as Muslims in modern Lebanon in 
“Contractual prayer of Christians and Muslims in Lebanon,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations 9:1 (1998), 65-82. I thank Martha Mundy for bringing this article to my attention.
2.1. Ethics, Religion and Law
Vows and oaths pertain to the relationship between individuals and 
God. Of the several verses in the Quran that recommend or oblige the 
believer to stand by his/her word, Naḥl 91 is most illustrative of the 
composite character of humans’ covenant with God to believe in Him 
and follow His commands, and their covenant to fulfill their promises 
to one another. It reads: “Fulfil the Covenant of God when ye have 
entered into it, and break not your oaths after ye have confirmed them; 
indeed ye have made God your surety; for God knoweth all that ye 
do.”38 Oaths and vows, like other unilateral statements of will, such as 
manumission of slaves or divorce--but unlike promises (va‘d ), may not 
be withdrawn. Once sworn, they generate a self-imposed obligation 
(iltizām).39 Swearing a false oath is a great sin for which there is no 
expiation,40 and, according to Hanafis, an oath is valid even if it is 
imposed, which may apply to some of the cases discussed in this study.41 
The nature of the obligation generated by vows varies according to 
the pledged act (menzūr bih). When the pledge is an act that is not 
religiously mandatory, its fulfillment is optional (muḫayyer). In other 
words, the prospective beneficiary may not demand fulfillment of the 
nezir.42 As in contracted oaths (mün‘aḳide), the vow-taker may opt for 
expiation (kefāret) rather than fulfill the pledge.43 The amount of money 
38) Nahl: 91, e Qur’an: Text, Translation & Commentary, tr. Abdullah Yusuf Ali (New 
York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1987); see also Tawbah: 4 and Maidah 1. 
39) Chafik T. Chehata, Essai d’une théorie générale de l’obligation en droit musulman (Le 
Caire: F.E. Noury & Fils, 1936), 168; Esen, ‘İslam Hukuku’nda Nezir’, 14, 17. e words 
deyn and borc, both meaning debt, are sometimes used interchangeably with nezir, as in 
“let it be my debt/ deynim/borcum olsun”. Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, Fetāvā, 183; ‘Abdü’r-raḥīm 
Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:324; İbn Abī İsḥaḳ Muḥammed b. İsmā‘īl (1096-1166), Fetāvā-yı Mun-
taḫibe (Süleymaniye Library, Ms. Kasidecizade 277), 49.
40) Esen, ‘İslam Hukuku’nda Nezir’, 65; also Ḥalebī, Multaḳa, 1:302.
41) Multaḳa, 1: 303. Cp. EI2, s.v.Nadhr (J. Petersen), 7: 847 on free will.  
42) Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendi, Fetāvā, 182-83 (quoting from Durar and Bazzāzīya); Abdü’r-rahīm 
Efendī, Fetāvā 1:324-25; Yeñişehrī Ebü’l-Fażl ‘Abdullāh, Behcetü’l-fetāvā ma‘a’n-nukūl 
(İstanbul: Darü’t-tıbā‘ati’l-āmire, 1849/1266), 144; İbn Abī İsḥaḳ, Fetāvā, 49; ‘Aṭā’ullah 
Efendī, Fetāvā,122. 
43) Expiation consists of manumitting a slave, feeding or clothing ten poor people, or fasting 
for three days if one cannot afford any of the former. But if one can afford any of these 
pious deeds, fasting is not an option. Feyżullāh Efendi, Fetāvā, 137 [quoting Khāniyya]. 
Also Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:324; ‘Aṭā’ullah Efendī, Fetāvā, 122. 
that is almost routinely stipulated as expiation for broken oaths and 
vows suggests that (a) people commonly resorted to oaths and vows (b) 
they often broke them, and (c) they took expiation seriously, as, for 
example, Ayntabi Mehmed Çelebi, who willed 1,550 ġurūş in 1689 for 
the expiation of his broken oaths and other poorly performed religious 
duties.44 
Vows that create an irrevocable obligation are those that seek ḳurbet, 
i.e. closeness to God. Acts that are religiously mandatory (farẓ or vācib), 
such as fasting, prayer, or alms-giving, fall in this category.45 Thus, the 
following statement committed the vow-taker forever:  “I shall fast every 
Thursday for the rest of my life if my son returns safely from the war-
front”. Unlike worship (ibādet), ḳurbet, involves not only an act that 
serves to glorify God but also an additional purpose or utility of social 
relevance, like alms-giving or building a waqf.46 In fatwa collections, 
the pledge (menzūr bih) is always an act of ḳurbet.47 One may argue 
that some public vows or, with a stretch of imagination, all public vows, 
involve ḳurbet. Acts like the cleaning of the Sacur River or the repair 
of a court building are clear examples of charitable acts of public rele-
vance. As for payments to be delivered to the central treasury or the 
imperial kitchen, found almost exclusively in vows imposed by the state, 
it is likely that these are considered to belong to the hazy domain in 
which the rights of God and the state’s guardianship over those rights 
overlapped. The rights of God involve, apart from the religious obliga-
tions of believers, what is considered as public interest, including any-
thing that does not serve the private interests of private individuals.48 
44) Ayntab CR no. 37/59/1; on conditions of expiation, Ḥalebī, Multaḳa, 1:303. 
45) Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, Fetāvā, 183; İbn Abī İsḥaḳ, Fetāvā, 49.
46) Esen, ‘İslam Hukuku’nda Nezir’, 18.
47) Beneficiaries mentioned in fatwa books: the poor (Es‘ad Efendī), war captives (İbn Abī 
İsḥaḳ), the poor of the medine-yi münevvere (‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī), the waqf administrator 
(on behalf of medine münevvere) (‘Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī), medine-yi münevvere itself (İbn 
Abī İsḥaḳ), religious foundations or religious personages (mosques, tombs, convents, 
scholars, shaikhs) (Es‘ad Efendī, Feyżullāh Efendī, ‘Abdü’r-raḥīm Efendī, İbn Abī İsḥaḳ), 
descendants of the Prophet (Es‘ad Efendī, İbn Abī İsḥaḳ), waqfs (Yeñişehrī), governors (İbn 
Abī İsḥaḳ), officials (ehl-i örf   ) (Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, Feyżullāh Efendī, Es‘ad Efendī), the 
state (miri) (Feyżullāh Efendī), and the central treasury (beytü’l-mal ) (‘Abdü’r-raḥīm Efendī).
48) Baber Johansen, “Secular and Religious Elements in Hanafite Law. Function and Limits 
of the Absolute Character of Government Authority,” in Contingency in a Sacred Law, Legal 
Historically, these rights formed a legitimate basis to expand the sphere 
of state authority into a wide range of areas. 
Public vows, as defined here, clearly were not about private interests. 
Still, the person who takes the vow is not obliged to perform his/her 
pledge. Conditional vows, i.e. those in which the vow-taker’s respon-
sibility is contingent upon the occurrence of another act, may be 
 expiated if the condition is a negative wish, e.g., something that the 
vow-taker wants to avoid. For example, “I shall fast every Thursday if 
I go to my mother-in-law’s house again.” These vows, called lecāc, are 
thought to strengthen one’s statement; hence, they are treated like oaths. 
Structurally, all public vows are lecāc, i.e. the vow-taker may choose 
expiation instead of fulfilling the vow.49 Most importantly, nobody, 
including the beneficiary of the vow, can force the vow-taker to fulfill 
her/his promise. S/he becomes a sinner (āsim) if s/he does not fulfill it, 
and that is all—putting aside the subjective graveness of sinning, which 
we cannot measure.50 
Vows in which the state (mīrī) or state authorities are specified as 
beneficiaries are no exception. According to Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī (1692), 
who was the şeyḫü’l-islām until a few years before the Cyprus and Bosna-
Saray incidents related above, a vow-taker may not be forced to stand 
by his pledge even if it involves a payment to the state. One of his 
fatwas addresses a closely matching situation: 
If Zeyd puts up ‘Amr (yanına alsa) after having said, ”I will owe the state 
(mīrī) 500 ġurūş if I put up ‘Amr”, will he owe the state 500 ġurūş just by 
having said that (mücerred böyle dimekle)? e answer: He will not.51 
It would appear that state-related vows emerged about a generation 
before ‘Alī Efendi, as did debates about their validity. For example, 
and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden, 1999), 213-14. Typically, offences against 
rights of God are theft, banditry, unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusations of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, drinking alcohol, and apostasy. Peters, Crime and Punishment, 53-55.
49) Similarly, in Hanafi law, contracts that involve negative performance obligations, i.e. 
the obligation not to do something, do not normally generate liability in case of breach. 
Talip Türcan, “İslâm Borçlar Hukukunda Doğrudan Olumsuz Edimin Sözleşmeye Konu 
Olması Sorunu,” Ekev Akademi Dergisi 7/14 (2003), 104. 
50) İbn Abī İsḥaḳ, Fetāvā, 50; Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, Fetāvā, 1:144.
51) Ibid., 1:145. 
şeyḫü’l-islām Yaḥyā (1662-74) specified that a vow that makes ‘servants 
of the state’ (ehl-i ‘örf   ) the beneficiary is not valid (nezir olmaz).52 By 
the last quarter of the century, vows in which the state or state autho-
rities are the beneficiary were recognized as vows but, as before, they 
do not entail legal liability or other legal consequence (ḳażā’ī ḥükm). 
Vows belong to the domain of the rights of God, and entail religious 
consequences alone.53 Thus, Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendī, like other Ottoman 
şeyḫü’l-islāms and pre-Ottoman jurists, did not allow the transformation 
of a religious/moral obligation into a legal obligation. By the same 
token, he did not allow the state to expand its authority further within 
the domain of the rights of God, i.e. the domain of sin, even if the state 
was already moving in that direction.54
2.2. Community, ritual and law
If vows lacked consequences enforceable by the legal machinery of the 
state, why then did people make vows in public matters and more 
importantly, why did they register them? In other words, on what did 
the performative power of the vows and their registration rest? 
Part of the answer to this question lies in the now-challenged idea 
of legal centralism or state law as a system of rules with an exclusive 
monopoly over the management of rights and liabilities. In the past 
few decades, legal anthropologists have argued that even in present day 
societies, legal sanction is only one of the devices used by contracting 
parties in order to secure performance. Even today, we are told, “most 
transactions are governed by informal community norms.”55  Legal 
definitions and rules may overlap with popular notions of contract but 
they do not necessarily coincide. In pre-modern contractual regimes, 
52) Ibid., 31a.
53) Bilmen, Kamus, 8/187.
54) Compare the criminalization of sin, associated with the growth of the early modern 
state in Europe. Bruce Lenman and Geoffrey Parker, “e state, the community and the 
criminal law in early modern Europe,” in Crime and the Law: Social History of Crime in 
Western Europe Since 1500, ed. V.A.C. Gatrell, B. Lenman and G. Parker (London: Europa 
Publications, 1980), 37.
55) Mark C. Suchman, “e Contract as Social Artifact,” Law & Society Review, 37/1 
(2003), 94-95.
the role of normative devices that were not controlled by the state must 
have been larger.
In Ottoman society, the third major locus of normative enforcement 
(apart from the state and God) was the community. The ‘sanctity of 
contract’, to quote Calhoun, “[was] not characteristic of the contract 
but of the membership of its parties in the community.”56 In this con-
text, Rosen’s remarks about assertory judicial oaths in modern Morocco 
are especially relevant. Concerning oaths elicited when no other evi-
dence can be produced by the litigants (taḥlīf   ), Rosen points out that 
since “people would be less inclined to bond with false swearers ... one 
wouldn’t want to risk his overall attractiveness” by swearing a false oath. 
Therefore, he argues, the community serves “as a means of bringing 
utterances to the realm of truth.”57 It is known that at least some early 
modern Ottomans also took their oaths seriously. Even though such 
oaths may appear irrational (from our disenchanted perspective of three 
or four centuries remove), many litigants declined to swear (nükūl-u 
yemīn) in a situation in which it meant the difference between winning 
and losing a case.58 It can be argued that, as in the case of assertory 
oaths, social accountability was a factor that helped vows to materialize. 
This is not to exclude the role of the vow-taker’s sense of religious and 
moral accountability—although our knowledge about the mental world 
56) C. J. Calhoun, “Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for Comparative 
Research,” Social History 5 (1980), 117.
57) Lawrence Rosen, e Anthropology of Justice, Law as Culture in Islamic Society (Cambridge, 
Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1989, repr. 1990), 35. See also David S. Powers, Law, 
Society and Culture in the Maghrib: 1300-1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 163. Powers too refers to fear of loss of reputation as well as fear of God as possible 
reasons for abstaining from taking an oath. 
58) Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam, 49-50; James Grehan, “e Mysterious Power 
of Words: Language, Law, and Culture in Ottoman Damascus (17th-18th centuries),” 
Journal of Social History 37 (2004), 991-1015. On the practice of inviting the defendant 
to take an oath (istihlāf   ) and refusal to do so, see ‘Alī Efendi, Fetevā, II: 64-67. Examples 
of refusal to take an oath: Ayntab CR no. 25/16/1, no. 38/37/2, no. 40/89/2. Also Üsküdar 
Court Register no. 23, Rec. no. 109, where the defendant takes an oath to refute accusations 
of theft. e plaintiff reports, “I … believe him and withdraw my complaint.” In Sümeyye 
Akça, ‘Üsküdar Kadılığı 23 Nolu ve H. 968-970 Tarihli Sicilin Diplomatik Yönden 
İncelenmesi: Metin ve İnceleme’, Unpublished MA esis, Marmara University, 2005, 
p. 76. 
of the Ottomans does not allow us to speculate about how they handled 
dilemmas of religious conscience and material interest.
One may also argue that the ritual of the vow itself, i.e. the utterance 
and recording of the contractual statement, is another source for the 
performative potential of the vow. In our case, the ritual comes into 
view most graphically in the Cyprus and Bosna Saray incidents, where 
stone pillars fulfilled the function that qadi registers fulfilled in other 
cases. That the pillar mattered is indicated by the attempts of the 
Cypriot a’yān, who sought its demolition, to petition in person in Istan-
bul. And when disorder returned to the island after a little while, it was 
“because the stone had been removed,” Mehmed Paşa wrote.59 
This is not to suggest that early modern Ottomans lived in a ‘magi-
cal world’ in which ‘word [as such] was performative’, as suggested by 
Grehan with regard to eighteenth-century Damascus.60 Modern con-
tract regimes also have a ritualistic side. Suchman argues:
Even if transacting parties know relatively little about specific legal doctrines 
and have no intention of seeking court enforcement, the ceremony of draft-
ing and signing a contract may reenact and reinforce central elements of 
faith, both about the transaction itself and about the larger social order…61
In the Ottoman case, since we know next to nothing about contract 
procedures outside the court, we can only speculate that the formalism 
of the court may have enhanced the ceremonial power of the contrac-
tual word. It is important to remember that although the role of the 
community in contract enforcement must have continued, our main 
source of information about the practice itself happens to be registers 
kept at state courts by state functionaries. What some scholars call the 
“judicial revolution of the early modern era” in Europe is known to 
have entailed a relative decline in the role of the community and com-
munity rituals in judicial matters and the symmetrical rise of bureau-
cratic mechanisms of dispute settlement and of state rites.62 Judging 
59) “Çūnki ‘adem-i taḥrīk fitnelerine sedd-i mümāna’at olan seng rū-nihāde-i ṣafḥa-i türāb 
oldu...” Zübde-i Vekayiât, 391. 
60) Grehan, “e Mysterious Power of Words.”
61) Suchman, “Contract as artifact,” 111.
62) Lenman and Parker, “e state, the community,” 11-48; Eibah, “Burgers or the town 
council?” 14-26; C. Muldrew, “From a ‘light cloak’ to an ‘iron cage’: historical changes in 
from the history of Ottoman bureaucracy, the Ottoman experience was 
probably closely parallel. Thus, a composite model of rights-manage-
ment that embraced both custom and law on the one hand and com-
munity and the state on the other appears to be particularly suitable 
for studying the early modern period.63 The examination of vows from 
this perspective, rather than from the formal perspective of sharia ver-
sus custom, looks promising because the relationship between custom 
and law in the Hanafi tradition did not involve a progressional hierar-
chy between custom and law in the way that the idea of ‘early modern 
judicial revolution’ might suggest. Rather, especially after the thirteenth 
century, and especially under the Mamluks and the Ottomans, custom 
was a recognized source of law, and also, it was as custom (‘örf   ) that 
kanun, law originating from the state or the ruler, was recognized by 
jurists as legitimate.64 
2.3. Between Custom and Law
Although a vow is not a shar‘i-legal but a shar‘i-religious act, public 
vows are not completely devoid of elements of legality. Put differently, 
they do not appear, in hindsight, unsuitable for scrutiny in legal terms. 
Close scrutiny suggests that public vows provided a customary, yet law-
like solution to some of the limitations embedded in the Ottoman/
Islamic contract regime, such as the absence of a general theory of 
contract, legal weaknesses regarding enforceability, especially of prom-
issory agreements and, finally, in some cases, the absence of legal 
the relation between community and individualism,” in Communities in Early Modern 
England, ed. P. Withington and A. Shepard (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000), 156-77. 
63) For a parallel debate regarding the significantly different Chinese context, see Hiroaki 
Terada, “e Nature of Social Agreements (Yue) in the Legal Order of Ming and Qing 
China (Part One),” International Journal of Asian Studies 2 (2005), 309-27 and Jérôme 
Bourgon, “Aspects of Chinese Legal Culture – e Articulation of Written Law, State, and 
Society: A Review,” International Journal of Asian Studies 4 (2007), 241-58.
64) Baber Johansen, “Coutumes locales et coutumes universelles: aux sources des règles 
juridiques en droit musulman hanéfite,” Annales Islamologiques 27 (1993): 29-35; Gideon 
Libson, “On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law,” Islamic Law 
and Society, 4 (1997), 131-55; Miriam Hoexter, “Qadi, Mufti and Ruler: eir roles in the 
Development of Islamic law,” in Law, Custom and Statute in the Muslim World, ed. Ron 
Shaham, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 67-85.
 personality. In order to identify these elements, I shall consider public 
vows, in what follows, as worldly pledges. 
Like an ‘aḳd, nezir is an expression of human will that creates obliga-
tion. More specifically, it resembles a unilateral juridical act such as gift, 
bequest or release of debt that involves an offer (īcāb) but not necessar-
ily an acceptance (ḳabūl ).65 In all public vows, the presence of more 
than one will is implicit, even in vows made to renounce office. In the 
latter case, that the vow-taker’s intent to give up his claim is matched 
by the will of those who are subject to his authority can be deduced 
from other court records that reveal the mechanics of access to local 
office. When browsing court registers from the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, one gets the impression that it was nearly impossible to 
wield local authority without the consent (rıżā) of the ‘people’.66 Nev-
ertheless, formally, the expressed will of the person taking the vow in 
these cases is unilateral, and such acts are not viewed favorably by the 
Sunni schools of law other than the Malikis. The Hanafis are particu-
larly emphatic in arguing that unilateral acts are not binding (lāzım).67 
Thus a unilateral act is not any more enforceable than a vow —although, 
one might argue, specifying a charitable or public cause as the benefi-
ciary may reflect awareness of this predicament and a desire to coun-
teract it.68  
65) Hussein Hassan, “Contracts in Islamic Law: the Principles of Commutative Justice and 
Liberality,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 13/3 (2002): 257; Saba Habachy, “e system of 
Nullities in Muslim Law,” e American Journal of Comparative Law, 13/1 (1964): 62. See 
also Noor Mohammad, “Principles of Islamic Contract Laws,” Journal of Law and Religion 
6 (1988), 123-24. 
66) Several examples in Konya CR no. 59 in M. Faruk Karacaoğlu, ‘1765–1768 Yılları 
Arasında Konya’da Sosyal Ve Ekonomik Hayat (59 Numaralı Konya Şer’iye Siciline Göre)’, 
Unpublished MA esis, Selçuk University 2008. See also Antonios Anastasopulos, ‘Im -
perial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774’, Unpublished 
PhD esis (Cambridge University, 1998), 51-91; and Ali Yaycıoğlu, ‘e Provincial 
Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, And Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)’ 
Unpublished PhD thesis (Harvard University, 2008), Ch. 3.
67) Chehata, Essai, 150-51; Mehmet Akif Aydın, “İslam Hukukunda Tek Taraflı Hukuki 
İşlem,” in İslâm ve Osmanlı Hukuku Araştırmaları (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1996); Y. Linant 
de Bellefonds, Traité de droit musulman comparé, eorie générale de l’acte juridique (Paris: 
Mouton & Co, 1965), 1:157-68; Emine Gümüş Böke, ‘İslam hukukunda tek taraflı hukuki 
işlemler’, Unpublished PhD thesis (Selçuk University, 2006), 72-73, 91-92.
68) See p. X above on ḳurbet.
Statements of will embedded in public vows are also legally impaired 
in another respect. Although they clearly embody a contractual spirit, 
they do not match any of the contract types recognized in Islamic law, 
and what is not recognized may not be legally enforced. Even though 
Islamic law matured relatively faster and earlier than post-Roman law 
in Europe and developed very sophisticated categories, Muslim jurists 
did not produce a general law of contract—which emerged in Europe 
only in the nineteenth century. Instead, they built a system of nominate 
contracts, each meticulously defined. Thus, contractual relations that 
do not fit in the nominate categories cannot be recognized by law.69 
Nevertheless, changing social needs inevitably generated new forms 
of contract in Muslim societies. First becoming ‘custom’, they were 
recognized as local ‘urf. Some of these new forms eventually were incor-
porated into written law, i.e. new nominate categories emerged. Dou-
ble rent (icāreteyn) and conditional sale (bey‘ bi’l-vefā) are examples of 
new contracts that were incorporated into the legal corpus, using ele-
ments from existing contracts, as social practice called for their recogni-
tion and regulation. Scholars then ‘vetted’ them by analogy.70 As for 
those customary contracts that did not become ‘law’, they too were 
accommodated through a number of legal mechanisms. 
One mechanism used to make a new contract legally recognizable is 
to couch it in a nominate binding contract by stipulating it as the lat-
ter’s condition (şarṭ żımne’l-‘aḳd ), even if the two clauses are quite unre-
lated in subject matter. In these cases, the condition is in fact the main 
transaction sought by the parties.71 Obviously, this structure closely 
parallels the structure of public vows, which are all conditional vows in 
which the condition defines the actual purpose of the promissor. The 
format “I vow to do x if I do y,” implies a negative intention, i.e. the 
69) Chehata, Essai, 41-42. e liberal approach to contract of Ibn Taymiyya and his students 
constitutes an exception. Oussama Arabi, “Contract Stipulations in Islamic Law: e 
Ottoman Majalla and Ibn Taymiyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30 (1998), 
29-50. 
70) Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return 
(e Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 98-99; Parviz Owsia, Formation of Contract: 
A Comparative Study under English, French, Islamic, and Iranian Law (London: Graham 
and Trotman, 1994), 138-39. Also Libson, “On the Development of Custom,” 131-55; 
Hoexter, “Qadi, Mufti and Ruler,” 67-85.
71) Owsia, Formation of Contract, 138-39.
intent not to do y.  Here too, the condition and the vow are essentially 
unrelated. At the same time, the ‘condition’, being the primary objective 
of the act, the vow (menzūr bih) functions like a penal clause that dis-
courages non-performance of the promise. As in medieval Europe, 
where contract enforcement was a major problem and the attachment 
of a penal clause was a common remedy, in conditional vows obligation 
and liability do not overlap.72 
Another mechanism that renders innominate contracts legally rec-
ognizable is the contract of ṣulḥ (composition/settlement). A contract 
of composition or amicable settlement is a binding pact and can be 
used to give “binding force to an agreement not recognized in se by the 
law”. It is the flexibility of ṣulḥ as a contract that allows it to be used in 
much broader ways as ‘people’s law’ rather than amicable settlement 
alone.73 
In some public vows, elements of ṣulḥ are easily recognizable. One 
such case involves a dispute between dye house owners in Ayntab and 
the waqf of Husrev Pasha in Aleppo. Reportedly, the waqf suffered losses 
due to a large increase in the number of dye houses in Ayntab subse-
quent to its establishment in the sixteenth century. In 1704, dye house 
owners promised to pay 300 ġurūş annually to the waqf in order to 
make up for its losses, but they did not honor this contract, and in 
1713, another contract was made whereby dyers now vowed to pay 
2,500 ġurūş to the imperial kitchen should they fail in their obligation 
towards the waqf.74 
The craftsmen’s vows (see above) also represent the meeting of wills, 
as in contracts proper: the will of those who produced substandard felt 
72) David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 2; Herald J. Berman, “e Religious Sources of General 
Contract Law: An Historical Perspective,” Journal of Law and Religion, 4/1 (1986), 103-
124.
73) Aida Othman, ‘And Sulh is Best: Amicable Settlement and Dispute Resolution in Islamic 
Law’, Unpublished PhD thesis (Harvard University, 2005), 170-80.
74) Hüseyin Çınar, “18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ayıntab Şehri’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik 
Durumu.” Unpublished PhD thesis (İstanbul University, 2000), 328-29; and Ayntab CR 
no. 105/325 (rebī’ü’l-āḫır 1161/1748), where janissary tanners and other tanners are 
reconciled after a dispute regarding illegitimate exactions of the janissaries, and the two 
groups of tanners together vowed to pay 50 ġurūş to the qadi should this settlement be 
violated.
or who preempted the guild of coppersmiths in the purchase of raw 
copper, and the will of the rest of the craftsmen. From a practical point 
of view, these vows function like collective contracts meant to settle 
differences between at least two parties.
Not all public vows are so explicitly ṣulḥ-like. It is clear in all cases, 
however, that vows are preceded by a dispute or conflict of wills. Vows 
in which the vow-taker renounces office or authority clearly reflect an 
earlier dispute between the vow-taker, i.e. the office-holder, and various 
collectivities or the ‘people’. Similarly, state-imposed vows regarding 
security and order also follow an episode of conflict, ranging from 
outright rebellion and mayhem to mere tax evasion. Here too, vows 
mark a moment of reconciliation, as in a contract of amicable settle-
ment. 
At the same time, vows in a ṣulḥ or ṣulḥ-like act may play an addi-
tional role. The statements of will expressed therein are all promissory, 
i.e. about future performance. The requirement in Islamic contract law 
to avoid uncertainty (ġarār) limits the scope of promissory contracts.75 
Vows, by definition promissory, may alleviate this problem.
Finally, let us note that judging from Ottoman court practice, private 
business contracts did not involve oaths or vows. In the Anatolian cit-
ies with which I am familiar, it was uncommon to register business 
contracts, unless they were preceded by a dispute. I suspect that the 
reason why vows were not part of these agreements was the lack of need 
for additional binding measures, because business was about ‘claims of 
men’ (huḳūḳu’n-nās), i.e. the rights of transacting private parties, already 
well-defined and regulated by nominate contracts. Most of Islamic 
 contract law is about the transfer and management of property and 
usufruct. Non-economic human association is also subject to legal reg-
ulation and protection, such as municipal matters, namely the right to 
air, water and space in ‘books of walls’ (hiytān) or intercommunal rela-
tions in ‘books of right conduct’ (kerāhiye and, partly, siyer). But these 
regulations concern non-contractual relations. Other kinds of non-
economic association, e.g. corporate association calling for recognition 
of legal personality, or association in an ad hoc collective action, lack 
legal expression. It is precisely in this context, i.e. to create an idiom 
75) Mohammad, “Principles of Islamic Contract Laws,” 123-24.
for rights arising from innominate association, that nezirs seem to have 
operated, as do pacts of various kinds in public life—as will be seen 
below.
3.1. Social Change and Public Vows
If nezir was in fact a medium to anchor what was not legally recognized 
in quasi-legal formality, was there an increased need for such a medium 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Further, did existing 
forms of association begin to be registered because, for example, there 
was an increasing need for their legal recognition and protection? Or 
were public vows themselves a novelty?
First, if vows had always been part of public life and it was only their 
registration that started in the seventeenth century, then, clearly, there 
was a shift from an oral normative order to a written legal culture. There 
is sufficient evidence to indicate that written legal culture was indeed 
advancing in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the striking expan-
sion, beginning in the seventeenth century, of the court-register collec-
tions from most towns, certainly in the central lands, it would appear 
that the legal value of documentation also was on the rise. Already in 
the seventeenth century, courts were willing to accept private docu-
ments after due attention was paid to the authenticity of the handwrit-
ing on title deeds (temessüks).76 At the same time, however, a shift 
towards anonymity in larger and more complex cities, i.e. relative 
decline in communal control, may have encouraged documentation. 
76) Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendi, Fetāvā, 2:40-41, 48; Feyżullāh Efendi, Fetāvā, 346-47, 358, 378, 
388. According to Mecelle (Article 1736), state documents such as title deeds, royal registers 
(defter-i hakani) and court registers with official seals beyond doubt of forgery are acceptable 
as evidence. Ali Himmet Berki, Açıklamalı Mecelle (Istanbul: Hikmet Yayınları, 1982), 390. 
However, the genealogy of this idea must be traced backwards in earlier legal literature. 
Sporadic examples of state papers used as evidence without oral collaboration by witnesses 
can be found in court registers. For example, Kayseri Court Register no. 66-1/38, dated 
1657, in Rıdvan Yurtlak, ‘66/1 Numaralı Kayseri Şer’iye Sicili (H.1067/1657), Trans-
kripsiyon ve Değerlendirmesi’, Unpublished MA esis (Erciyes University, 1998), 122. 
Compare Boğaç Ergene, “Evidence in Ottoman Courts: Oral and Written Documentation 
in Early-Modern Courts of Islamic Law,” e Journal of the American Oriental Society 124 
(2004), 471-91; idem, “Document Use in Ottoman Courts of Law: Observations from 
the Sicils of Çankırı and Kastamonu,” Turcica 37 (2005), 83-111.
Second, it is possible that public vows were a novelty of the seven-
teenth century, as suggested by evidence from fatwa collections. This 
possibility requires locating public vows in contemporary public life 
and its cultural idioms. 
Many decades ago Inalcik coined the term ‘communalization’ to 
characterize the intensification of the activities and power of collective 
agents in Ottoman public life, beginning in the seventeenth century.77 
His lead in this diagnosis has been confirmed by subsequent scholar-
ship, which points to a lively public life in cities in diverse regions of 
the empire. This finding clearly matches the political processes associ-
ated with what used to be called the ‘period of decentralization’ and the 
‘age of a‘yāns’. An important aspect of this vigor was local processes of 
decision-making, shaped by collective will. Whether that was the patro-
nizing will of local elites or some degree of popular voice—which 
people?—is a secondary issue for present purposes. It has been demon-
strated, for example, that collective will, more specifically, ‘people’s’ 
(ahālī) participation and consent in the election of the local ‘official 
notable’ in the second half of the eighteenth century, was an essential 
aspect of local governance during this period.78 Evidence from Anato-
lia indicates that the participation and consent of the ‘people’ was 
needed for allocating other offices and positions already in the sixteenth 
century. Typically, a candidate for office was selected by unanimous 
decision (cümlenin ittifāḳıyla), and the appointee would promise to 
serve as required: “ta‘ahhüd ve iltizām idüp,” a phrase that functioned 
like an oath of office. Likewise, removal from a wardenship (ketḫüdā) 
or deputyship (vekīl ) was contingent on collective will, itself a mirror 
image of the vows taken to renounce office or authority (see above).79 
77) Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Otoman Administration,” in 
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Islamic History, ed. omas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale 
and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Pres, 1977), 37.
78) Anastasopulos, ‘Imperial Institutions and Local Communities’; Yaycıoğlu, ‘e Pro-
vincial Challenge’. 
79) Kayseri CR no. 66-2/107, dated 1657, in Murat Tan, ‘66/2 Numaralı Kayseri Şer’iye 
Sicili (H. 1067-68/M. 1656/57), Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme’, Unpublished MA 
esis (Erciyes University, 1998), 89-90; Adana CR no. 17/144, dated 1744, in Metin 
Ceylan, ‘17 No’lu (H. 1156-1157 M. 1743-1744) Adana Şer`iyye Sicili Transkripsiyon ve 
Kataloğu’, Unpublished MA esis (İnönü University, 1996), 379; Konya CR no. 59/97/2, 
dated 1767, in Karacaoğlu, ‘1765–1768 Yılları Arasında Konya,” 413-15.
More importantly, collective will and/or consent was needed or in -
voked when a collectivity or a town incurred a financial or other official 
obligation, e.g. contributions towards local expenses as well as various 
taxes. In the relevant records, one finds, first, the consent (rıżā) of the 
‘people’ concerned for the amount to be paid and then, their pledge to 
pay it (ta‘ahhüd, mute‘ahhid ).80 In some cases, the pledge took the form 
of a solemn compact (‘ahd, mīsāḳ and, less commonly, mu‘āhede).81 ‘Ahd 
and mīsāḳ are both oath-constitutive terms of Quranic origin that refer 
to God’s covenant with mankind, as in the earlier Biblical tradition.82 
Unlike most vows, these statements are multilateral agreements. Like 
vows, they are promissory, and it would seem, they were the best that 
the available language of rights provided for corporate action. Again, 
like vows, they stand between custom, morality and law (because they 
are enacted at the court).83
80) Consent to a rise in lump sum head tax due to immigration, Konya CR no. 59/97/2 
and 129/2, dated 1766; consent to a negotiated tax increase by subjects of the Esb-Keşan 
tax farm, Konya CR no. 59/13/3, dated 1766, in Karacaoğlu, ‘1765–1768 Yılları Arasında 
Konya’, 177-78, 182; pledge to cover travel costs of the city representative, Trabzon CR 
no. 1890/17/5, dated 1728, in Gülseren Erden, ‘1890 Numaralı Trabzon Şer`iye Siciline 
göre ‘Trabzon’  H.1140-1141 (1727-1728)’, Unpublished MA esis, (Yüzüncü Yıl Uni-
versity, 2000), 142; consent to pay taxes after confirming that the related tax survey is 
correct, Ayntab CR no. 40/211/3, 221/1, dated 1693; Ayntab CR no. 18/195/3, dated 
1660; consent to deliver a certain amount of money to the tax farm holder, dated 1712, 
in Çınar, “18. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Ayıntab,’ 292.
81) Ḥalebī, Multaḳa, 1: 301. Abdü’r-rahīm Efendī, Fetāvā, 1: 321; Çatalcalı ‘Alī Efendi, 
Fetāvā, 180; ‘Atā’ullah Efendī, Fetāvā, 122 (quoting Hedāyā).
82) For example, Holy Quran, 13:20 (ar-Raʿd). Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, s.v. Ahid 
(Abdurrahman Küçük et al.), I: 532-35; EI2, s.v. ‘Ahd (Joseph Schacht), 1: 255. See Berman, 
“Religious foundations,” 106, for the argument that the general theory of contract law 
grew out of religious thought from the late Middle Ages onward, and the emphasis placed 
in Protestant theology on ‘the Covenant’ (‘ahd ) was a particularly important aspect of the 
process. According to this view, the nineteenth-century jurists “cut the general theory of 
contract loose from its moorings in the belief system, and replace[d] those moorings with 
individualism.”
83) Engin Akarlı, “Law in the Marketplace, 1730-1840,” in Dispensing Justice in Islam: 
Qadis and their Judgments, ed. M. Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters and David S. Powers 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 245-70, shows how ‘custom’-making agreements regis-
tered at the court went through a legal evolution, first receiving a qadi warrant, then an 
imperial decree and receiving the status of the official ‘order’ of the group. 
 Impressionistically speaking, this consensual discourse became only 
stronger in the second half of the eighteenth century, and it is possible 
that the introduction of the principle of local elections in the appoint-
ment of the official a‘yān (1765; 1791) and the city warden (1786; şehir 
ketḫüdāsı) played an important role in formalizing and furthering this 
discourse.
We need not take the terminology of the records at face value. What 
appears like consensual/contractual local politics in vows and other 
compacts, such as a tax commitment or consent to the authority of an 
office-holder, may have been the result of compulsion by local magnates 
or particular communities. Nor can one ignore the coercive dimension 
of vows elicited by the state. The fact that compulsion worked its way 
through a consensual/contractual discourse suggests, however, that con-
sent was a cultural ideal and, therefore, a source of legitimacy.84 
This cultural climate of collective initiative and negotiated bonds 
matches perfectly with Inalcik’s ‘communalization’. Yet, is ‘communal-
ization’ an appropriate term in this context? Since the canonization of 
the ‘community-association’ (Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft) dichotomy in 
the nineteenth-century, ‘community’ has come to represent mainly an 
a priori and ahistorical condition, as opposed to ‘society as rational 
association’. In Ottoman studies too, we commonly use the term ‘com-
munity’ to characterize diverse collectivities without taking into account 
variation over the lifespan of the Ottoman Empire. The presence in 
Ottoman public life of—somewhat romantically conceived—commu-
nities, “… characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emo-
tional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity”85 
well until the demise of the empire cannot be denied. Nevertheless, we 
need to recognize that the dynamism we observe in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries may not have rested on primeval communities that 
simply became stronger due, according to Inalcik, mainly to changes 
in the taxation system. If we begin to draw more freely on what we 
already know about economic change during this period, it becomes 
84) See also Yaycıoğlu, ‘e Provincial Challenge,’ 168, where he argues regarding a‘yān 
elections in the eighteenth century that even when the “elected” official a‘yāns had usurped 
office, they claimed to have been elected or given ‘people’s’ consent. 
85) Calhoun, “Community,” 106-8, quoting Robert Nisbet, e Sociological Tradition (New 
York, Basic Books, 1966), 48. 
clear that dynamism in public life coexisted with increased social dif-
ferentiation, which was not particularly favorable to ‘moral commit-
ment’ or ‘cohesion’. In fact, the increased visibility of collective contracts 
may be a sign that communities (and their moral economies) were 
threatened and that local publics, as more diverse agents with more 
visibly diverse stakes, were emerging. 
Concluding Remarks
Although we now take for granted the possibility of change in post-
classical Islamic law, we are still confronted with a largely uncharted 
territory regarding both the nature and extent of change. This is no less 
true in the case of Ottoman law. The question of substantive change 
has remained limited to the status of ḳanūns, the Ebussuud synthesis 
and the nineteenth-century reforms.86 Several aspects of legal practice, 
such as territoriality, custom as law, use of documents, the relationship 
between ethics and law, community and the court, punitive versus 
resti tutive elements, and the court’s power of prosecution, all await 
historicization. All of these topics are related to a larger question: the 
relationship between law as a normative domain theoretically under the 
monopoly of a (modern) state and all other normative orders operative 
in the realm. 
Since the pioneering works of Gerber and Akarli,87 both of whom 
emphasize the role of customary law in Ottoman legal practice, several 
scholars have argued for the coexistence of customary processes of dis-
pute settlement and different kinds of courts (non-Muslim community 
86) Notable exceptions are Baber Johansen, Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: the Peasants’ 
Loss of Property Rights as Interpreted in the Hanafite Legal Literature of the Mamluk and 
Ottoman Periods (London; New York: Croom Helm, 1988); Martha Mundy and Richard 
Saumarez Smith, Governing Property, Making the Modern State: Law, Administration and 
Production in Ottoman Syria (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 
87) Haim Gerber, “Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: the Court Records of 
17th-Century Bursa,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 211(1981), 131-47; idem, 
State, Society, and Law, 113-26; and Engin D. Akarlı, “Gedik: A Bundle of Rights and 
Obligations for Istanbul Artisans and Traders, 1750-1840,” in Law, Anthropology and the 
Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and ings, ed. Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166-200; idem, “Law in the Marketplace, 1730-1840.” 
courts, qadi courts and administrative courts) as well as for diversity 
within law administered at state institutions. This diversity, which was 
due to the amalgamation of custom, royal ‘custom’ and pre-Ottoman 
shari‘a, as well as the presence of different schools of law, has been given 
increasing attention lately, particularly due to interest in legal pluralism, 
still the dominant paradigm in legal anthropology. Our findings also 
point to the procedural and substantive complex that surrounded  public 
vows in their indeterminate position between custom, religious moral-
ity and law. More importantly, this complex was not frozen in time. 
Firstly, ‘custom’ in the case of public vows, was not about the ‘beaten 
path’. In other words, vows did not draw their legitimacy from old 
practice, but from present-day consensus of the groups concerned.88 
Secondly, bringing contracts under the guardianship of state courts 
signified a bolder claim on the part of the state vis-à-vis the claims of 
God (the domain of vows) and expansion of state control over custom-
ary processes of dispute resolution and social memory. Conscience, 
whether driven by religious concerns, moral concerns or rational cal-
culations, was also formally brought under state surveillance.  All these 
shifts appear as aspects of administrative centralization, a process that 
entered a new phase with Tanzimat in the nineteenth century.
The ‘boundaries of the state’ also had a spatial dimension. Public 
vows were customary contracts that were enacted in state law courts. 
No matter what jurists thought of this practice, it enjoyed official legit-
imacy, as may be inferred from the central state’s own use of the practice. 
To quote Johansen, it was de facto ‘juridified’.89 As noted earlier, there 
is no evidence that the practice struck roots in Arab provinces. This 
regional difference needs to be considered both in terms of the extent 
of the state’s legal authority and the nature of local custom, which, in 
this case, may have expressed itself as a more orthodox interpretation 
of earlier Sunni tradition. All this is not to suggest that alternative 
mechanisms for managing contractual relations in public life did not 
exist in these provinces. That must be the subject of another study.
88) Akarlı, “Law in the Marketplace, 1730-1840,” makes it clear that in the world of artisans, 
‘custom’ was nothing but a novel consensus about what custom was. In those cases, too, 
however, artisans continued to refer to old practice. 
89) Johansen, “Coutumes locales,” 31.
From the perspective of substantive law, public vows appear to be a 
remedy for limitations in Islamic law and a means of anchoring public 
contracts in formality/legality. According to fiqh and fiqh scholars, past 
and present, the use of the vow as a public contract may seem inap-
propriate or wrong. But as Reynolds remarks with regard to late medi-
eval practitioners of law who are sometimes looked down upon by legal 
historians for their ‘incorrect’ use of Roman law terminology, the non-
standard use of oaths and vows may “not necessarily [be] the mark of 
confusion or lack of legal technique. Adopting new words may be a 
sign of trying out new ideas so as to adapt them to different condi-
tions.”90 Perhaps there was a need for new ideas in Ottoman legal prac-
tice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Admittedly, public vows or compacts did not yield immediate results 
in substantive law. Mecelle, compiled nearly a century after some of the 
examples discussed in this study, was a step towards a general theory of 
contract, and even that was not a complete step. One can rather speak 
of a broader cultural affinity between vows and their registration and 
the constitutional changes of the Tanzimat era. On the one hand, the 
increased role of the state in the normative domain anticipated state 
modernization/centralization in the nineteenth century. On the other 
hand, new forms of local government such as neighborhood or village 
headmanship (muhtarlık), municipalities or provincial assemblies, also 
introduced in the Tanzimat era, were products of the same political 
culture that produced and was bolstered by public vows/contracts. 
Finally, if modern contract regimes in the late Ottoman Empire and 
its successor states were conceived and nurtured in pre-Tanzimat cul-
ture, as this study intimates, this would be one more instance of con-
tinuity, recently ‘discovered’, between the Tanzimat era and Ottoman 
‘early modernity’.91 
90) Susan Reynolds, “e Emergence of Professional Law in the Long Twelfth Century,” 
Law and History Review 21:2 (2003), 347-65.
91) For a recent general assessment from the perspective of political economy, see Karen 
Barkey, Empire of Difference: the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also see Shared Histories of Modernity: China, 
India and the Ottoman Empire, ed. H. İslamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009); Mundy, Governing Property. On political culture, see Hüseyin 
The concept of contract has an almost mystical quality about it, 
because of its assumed association with modernity and its central role 
in liberal political thought. Despite its practical demise in the twentieth 
century, contract may regain its former shine, perhaps, in a future turn 
of historiography and social theory. Today, however, since the under-
mining of all historical boundaries by post-modernism, the transition 
from oath to contract or from conscience to rational reasoning and 
reliance on the penal machinery of the modern state looks like a prot-
racted and multiplex process. Thus, the religious underpinnings of the 
conceptual repertoire to which public vows/contracts belonged should 
not come as surprise, nor should they be construed to imply that reli-
gious culture was ‘the’ repository of ideas and institutions from which 
Ottoman modernity originate.92 
Yılmaz, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Batılılaşma Öncesi Meşrutiyetçi Gelişmeler,” Dîvân 13 
(2008), 1-30.
92) Cp. Shumuel Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter, “Introduction: Paths to Early 
Modernities—A Comparative View,” Daedalus 127/3 (1998), Early Modernities, 1-18.
